tages of this account of indicative conditionals, and in section. 5 I reply to on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particles of Natural Language,” in Prag- matics of . if it is a valid inference, then the indicative conditional conclusion must be logically 3 H.P. Grice, in his William James lectures, 4 pursued the first of these . conditionals, but not those of indicative conditionals, are known to be false or at . of this view include Lewis [], Jackson [], [], and Grice [a]. 6.

Author: Kerr Doushura
Country: Georgia
Language: English (Spanish)
Genre: Finance
Published (Last): 9 January 2008
Pages: 167
PDF File Size: 12.77 Mb
ePub File Size: 9.7 Mb
ISBN: 587-2-90453-202-8
Downloads: 89948
Price: Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader: Vile

We use them often, accepting some, rejecting others. In the nearest world in which it rains, I don’t take my umbrella. Let’s consider this as applied to a problem raised by McGee with the following example. You have eliminated the possibility that both A and B are false. It is difficult to see why this should be so if conditionals are propositions with truth conditions. It is, at first sight, rather curious that the best-developed and most illuminating suppositional theory should place emphasis on uncertain conditional judgements.

But there are constraints on the relations between the facts and the counterfacts. They do not combine to yield a single proposition which is judged to be likely to be true just when the second is judged likely to be true on the supposition vrice the first. There are two ways in which 1 can be true: However, no theory has an intuitively adequate account of compounds of conditionals: Let A be epistemically possible for me.


If you think you should conditionlas access to this title, please contact your librarian. That is, ignore lines 3 and 4 in which A is false. You have ruled out line 4.

We cannot consistently have their premises highly probable and their conclusion highly improbable. For work in this tradition and valuable surveys of related work see De FinettiBelnap and Milne One is the conditiknals of a supposition. Our focus will be on conditional statements and what they express — conditional beliefs; but we will consider which of the theories we have examined extends most naturally to these other kinds of conditional.

He seems to advocate condirionals error theory of conditionals: They do not satisfy PPP. How do we test our intuitions about the validity of an inference? See Gibbardpp. Stalnaker calls the set of worlds which are not ruled out — the live possibilities — the context set.

The Material Conditional: Grice

To make the point in a slightly different way, let me adopt the following as an expository, heuristic device, a harmless fiction. Conditional commands can, likewise, be construed as having the force of a command of the consequent, conditional upon the antecedent’s being true. See Adams and Strengthening is a special case of transitivity, in which the missing premise is a tautology: So treating the premises would be to require of a valid argument that it preserve certainty: By our assumption b is certainly false.

For Jackson’s more recent thoughts on conditionals see his postscriptpp. We have a Stalnaker-like semantics. Not in a way that accords well with intuition, we have seen.


The difference is this: Any speech act can be performed unconditionally, or conditionally upon something else. Jackson is aware of this. But there is no consensus about the truth conditions of conditionals. And arguably, the gain in simplicity and clarity more than offsets the oddities.

Request removal from index.

We put fonditionals compounds of conditionals. As facts about the norms to which people defer, these claims can be tested. So if A is false, only one possibility remains: Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals was an attempt to provide truth conditions which were compatible with Ramsey’s and Adams’s thesis about conditional belief. A conditional judgement involves two propositions, which play different roles.

Material Conditional: Grice – Oxford Scholarship

It does not seem that the content of our conditional thought conditionwls changed. If this is his view, he cannot hold that his own theory is a psychologically accurate account of what people do when they use conditionals.

Although Supp and Hook give the same answer to Question 1, their reasons are different. Hence, it appears, if Supp is right, conditionals shouldn’t be construed as having truth conditions at all. Begriffsschriftin Geach, Peter and Black, Max, There does not seem to be any independent indicatife for thinking the content of the proposition has changed.