Bianculli, AC () Negotiating Trade Liberalization in Argentina and Chile: When Fulquet, G () El Proyecto Educativo Para El MERCOSUR Y Los Debates En Torno . Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. . Journals A-Z. editing, and Michelle Furman for her excellent design work. Joseph S. Tulchin resistance of Mercosur countries, particularly Brazil and Argentina: the launching Red de Investigaciones Económicas del Mercosur, Edificio Mercosur,. Piso 3. Alaska, Arizona (a minimum of 10 US citizens is required, the majority of them . Tucson: University of Arizona Press. “Etnografía del Budismo Zen Argentino: Ritual, Cuerpo y Poder en la “Nuevas religiones japonesas en el Mercosur: La Transnacionalización Ignorada. Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental.
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In the five remaining service sectors of which finance and communications u out in terms of economic significancethe extent of the commitments was comparatively generous in terms of both coverage and depth. Apparently, the post office authority tried unilaterally to bind a competitive regime for postal services in order to end the state monopoly.
Argentina undertook no market access and national treatment commitments in six sectors, namely education; environment; social and healthcare; recreation, culture and sport; transport; and other services. Cross-country differences in national treatment are slightly less marked than in market access, but they maintain the same pattern see Table 2.
Where does Argentina fit?
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Mercosud undertook all its commitments in financial services during the UR, afgentina that it did not take part in the negotiations of the second and fifth protocols. In those sectors in editoriial Argentina undertook commitments, they were even deeper than the OECD average. Apparently, the presentation of the telecommunications list of offers by Argentina was used by the local negotiators to try to extract some bilateral concessions from the United States on selected products. Immediately after the launching of the Uruguay Round UR inthe Argentine government allocated the functional responsibility for the technical work on services trade to the Economy Ministry, at that time still responsible for the conduct of international trade negotiations.
One of the first activities of the task force was to make a survey of those domestic regulations with implications for international trade in services. In effect, during these years Argentina entered into an ambitious process of reform in which economic institutions were overhauled.
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Mobile telephone services and PCS were bound without restrictions, but in the case of PCS the authorities retained the argentjna to determine the maximum number of operators per area.
The GATS offers largely reflect this phenomenon. In that agency produced one of the earliest proposals on services negotiations submitted to the GATT by a developing contracting party. The GATS was regarded as something distant and unrelated to business concerns, probably increasing the discretion of national authorities. Strategic considerations or domestic group pressures may have played a role in insurance commitments.
According to various testimonies, meetings organized to gather information to build the Argentine offer frequently ended in a list of demands over domestic policies such as tax policy rather than international negotiations.
Mode of supply 3 was restrained by the suspension of new authorizations for establishment removed in Apart from the role of domestic interest groups, multilateral trade negotiations can also be regarded as a strategic game in which governments look for reciprocal concessions. Based on Berlinski and Romero In effect, editorizl Argentina bound The only sub-sectors unbound were services auxiliary to insurance including broking and agency servicesother financial services and new financial services except national treatment for commercial presence, bound without restrictions.
Argentine trade officials had traditionally focused on trade in goods particularly temperate agriculture products and were thus not prepared for undertaking international negotiations in services.
This may have been a reaction to the demands of the US government concerning the level of commitments to be undertaken in this sector. At first sight, the Argentine case does not editofial to fit well with any of these explanations.
Commitments on Market Access: This suggests that strategic or reciprocity editrial, the last of which was at the centre of financial services negotiations, did not play a relevant role. In distribution services, Argentina bound edjtorial no restrictions retailing and wholesale trade services and franchising. Cross-border trade except for freight insurance is unbounded and the authorization of new entities is suspended however, the deregulation implemented in ended the suspension in the establishment of new insurance firms.
Instead of stating this limitation, the Argentine authorities opted for a horizontal exclusion. Other participants demanded concessions from Argentina especially in telecommunicationsbut the extent of commitments seems to have been basically driven by domestic xz, rather than external pressures or strategic considerations.
Domestic data and telex transmission, electronic mail, voice mail and electronic data interchange were bound with no restrictions. On the other hand, statistical information on services trade was scarce, unreliable and generally unsuited for providing a basis for negotiation Marchetti This demanded regular consultations edittorial other public-sector agencies, such as the Central Bank, the Insurance Superintendent, the Secretaries of Communications, Transportation and Tourism, the National Immigration Service and other agencies with normative and regulatory responsibilities for public utilities.
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This mervosur may reduce leverage in future multilateral as well as preferential negotiations, as shown by intra-Mercosur negotiations and other inter-regional preferential negotiations, such as that between Mercosur and the European Exitorial. Brazil and Chile were also above the Latin American average in terms of sectoral coverage, but well below in terms of depth of commitments. This hypothesis may be useful to understand trade policy-making in normal times, but it may shed less light during periods of stress and deep policy reform.
Argentina submitted an initial offer at the beginning msrcosurmore than two years before the presentation of the final list in In addition, Chile undertook no commitments in construction and construction-related engineering and distribution services.
First, the absence of commitments should not be taken as equivalent to the existence of restrictions, since a low level of commitments can reflect strategic behaviour.